Trial Judge Deliberately Prejudiced:

At my Trial in 1992 the Prosecution put material from a murder file (FSNI File 1942/910) before the Trial Judge with intention of creating an impresssion on the mind of the Trial Judge that the charges did not reflect police suspicions about me. For that reason my Lawyers asked the Judge not to hear my case because he had been improperly prejudiced against me.

Making sure that the judge picks up that there was a murder in which a similar bomb was used according to what they say. There is no way of testing this evidence, in fact, the Court does not know whether there was a similar bomb and the court at the end of the day, if the case went on in this manner wouldn’t know on proper evidence what similar bomb was used to murder anyone at all because there is no way that one can test this evidence.(Pages 9 -10 Trial Transcripts)

 HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETRIE: Do you think I should not hear the case because I have been prejudiced because of matters which you say I should not have had put before me?

MR. MOONEY: Yes, your honour. (Page 22 Trial Transcripts)


Acting Junior Counsel also made clear his objection to the inclusion of this prejudicial material.

 MR. ADAIR: I think your Honour has my point. I’m anxious that there shouldn’t be any possible prejudice to the defendant. (Page 23 Trial Transcripts)

 JUDGE PETRIE: … These matters are perhaps irrelevant but it is not my view that any prejudice has been shown to the defendant by the inclusion of these matters in the accounts which were put before the court at the stage of the Preliminary Enquiry, so I reject the application.(Page 25 Trial Transcripts)


As this material had been put before the Trial Judge during the course of the Trial that ensured that it would also be put before the Appeal Court creating the impression that, but for, the lack of evidence I was not facing more serious charges.


This matter has always haunted me until 2009 when my lawyers wrote to the PPS requesting access to the file which was used to prejudice the Trial Judge’s mind. The PPS refused access to the file on 8th June 2009 for the following reasons, “FSNI File 1942/91 contains no material relating to your client…”. Why were the ‘matters’ contained in that file put before the Trial Judge and the Judge refused to consider that they were being improperly used to prejudice him against me? The intended damage was done.

The trial judge failed to exert the authority vested in him to control the proceedings and enforce proper standards of behaviour. Regrettably, he allowed himself to be overborne and allowed his antipathy to both the appellant and his counsel to be only too manifest. (Randall v The Queen (PC) [2002] 1 WLR Page 2251 para e.) 


The Prosecution case was “a concoction and a fabrication, a series of dastardly lies being told” about me to ensure that a court of law would give the appearance of legitimacy to my false imprisonment.  At my Trial the PPS deliberately implicated me in a murder in a way that I could not defend myself against. The PPS created the impression that it had ‘unwittingly’ included references to a murder unconnected to me. Being seemingly reasonable the PPS had no objection if the Trial Judge should disregard this prejudicial material; by that stage I could not recover from the intentional prejudicial damage done. The PPS cunningly avoided disclosing that it had evidence to show that there was nothing to relate me to this murder and that there was no justification for its inclusion in the prosecution papers against me at Trial.


At minimum there is reasonable doubt about Judge Petrie’s independent, objective and impartial judgment even if my conviction had not been unlawful. The Trial Judge deprived me of the protection provided by the essential steps in criminal procedure. Despite serious irregularities, the Trial Judge’s tolerance of material misconduct by police officers had no limits. This tolerance is borne out by his failure to be in anyway critical of the nature of the case being put against me.


In his report, dated 9th July 2010, the Assistant Director of the PPS, Raymond Kitson expresses some confusion as to “(whatever he means by the phrase "prosecution team")”. I will explain; Gary McCrudden is a junior counsel with the PPS and the prosecution against me required that it be authorised and periodically reviewed by a more senior person in the PPS; Mr Kitson played a more involved and influential role in the malicious prosecution against me than he would prefer to be known.

Mr Kitson’s report was inappropriately lodged with the current Court and it should be discarded as unreliable material that no reasonable court could possibly rely upon it. That the Justice Minister’s lawyer, Mr McGleenan, is attempting to create the same ‘hymn sheet’ for the DoJ, PPS and PSNI to sing from is an unacceptable manipulation of the Court; not to mention the dangers of any furtherance to the perverting the course of justice in this case at Executive level.


The PPS Case Was Black & White

In addition to the Trial Judge being improperly influenced by the PPS it was the Prosecution, (and not the Defence), who first alerted the Trial Judge to the possibility of a false case being made out against me. With no supporting forensic evidence Crown Counsel summed up his case as being my word against that of the two soldiers.

This case so far as the essential facts are concerned is black and white, either there is a concoction and a fabrication, a series of dastardly lies being told by the military witnesses in this case or there is not. Mistake does not enter into it in my respectful submission. (Prosecution Page 523 Trial Transcripts)


... It is a question of a conspiracy of lies, a deliberate attempt to have this man convicted of an offence for which he should not have been convicted. (Page 517 of trial transcripts)


Under these circumstances the Trial Judge should have held special diligence to any inconsistencies or irregularities involved in the Prosecution case. At page 8 of his Judgment, the Trial Judge states that,

There appears to be no reason for the Soldiers to try to make false allegations against the Defendant, who, it is common case, was totally unknown to them.


The Judge’s statement above could also be said for me, but it is not. In any event, such a reason did exist. The crucial issue identified by the Trial Judge at page 7 of his Judgment was whether the Soldiers were correct in saying that I had the device in my hand or whether I was right in saying that it was on the wall when I was stopped. One obvious reason for making false allegations in those circumstances is that the soldiers on patrol may simply have assumed that by reason of the proximity of the coffee jar bomb to me when I was stopped that I must have been connected to it and the Soldiers were simply trying to improve the case against me.

It was incumbent upon the Trial Judge to be particularly concerned with any weaknesses or inconsistencies with the Soldiers Evidence given that the prosecution case involved a “conspiracy of lies” if I were telling the truth.  When the Trial Judge reduced the case down to credibility then, “ the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings”   (Belchev v. Bulgaria, 8 April 2004, para 74.)

No properly directed jury could have come to the conclusion and be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that I had possession of the jar. The Trial Judge should have stopped the case at the close of the prosecution submissions and not continued to keep the prosecution case going by requiring me to testify. Judge Petrie did not convict me on basis of any of the prosecution case but was ‘convinced’ of my guilt (unlawfully) because of my failure to state something at the scene of my arrest. I had no case to answer and was therefore entitled to an effective remedy at that point if not sooner.

What if a submission is wrongly rejected but the defendant is cross-examined into admitting his guilt? Should the conviction be said to be unsafe? We think it should. The defendant was entitled to be acquitted after the evidence against him had been heard. To allow the trial to continue beyond the end of the prosecution case would be an abuse of process and fundamentally unfair. So even in the extreme case, the conviction should be regarded as unsafe; the more so in the present.  (R v Smith[1999] 2 Cr.App.R. 238, last paragraph page 241.)


Despite presiding over a case with so many material irregularities AND having been put on notice by the prosecution that the case may involve, “a conspiracy of lies, a deliberate attempt to have this man convicted of an offence for which he should not have been convicted.” the Trial Judge was prepared to accept anything in order to convict,  

There will come a point when the departure from good practice is so gross, or so persistent, or so prejudicial, or so irremediable that an appellate court will have no choice but to condemn a trial… (Randall v The Queen (PC) [2002] 1 WLR, page 2251, paragraph C.)


My conviction having been unlawful means that I was held in captivity contrary to Section 14 of the European Prison Rules, which states that,

14. No person shall be admitted to or held in a prison as a prisoner without a valid commitment order, in accordance with national law.  (The European Prison Rules. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006)Which is in identical terms as Section 7(1)  Recommendation No. R (87) 3 (12 February 1987).)